The Constitutional Council Model
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Evidence suggests overwhelmingly
that only a direct election model would be successful at a referendum. This is a direct election model which
reconciles many of the concerns that minimalists have expressed about direct
election, and is one which could be appealing to and embraced by the public.
Consider the constitutional
arrangement we have in place now - it is not the Head of State (the Queen) who
exercises the reserve powers; it is another officer – the
Governor-General! Under the
Consitutional Council model, it is not the Head of State (the President) who
exercises the reserve powers; it is another officer – the Speaker. Whilst the President would be popularly
elected (as part of an election for a “Constitutional Council”),
the Speaker would be appointed in a bipartisan manner (similar to what has been
suggested under Parliamentary appointment models as the method of appointment
of the President).
The fundamental difference
between the Consitutional Council model and the most other models is that an
officer other than the Head of State would exercise the reserve
powers. The President is not simply a
powerless figurehead, however. The
President and the Constitutional Council exercise meaningful and significant
powers befitting a Head of State – see the documents below for details.
This model is a revision of my original Constitutional Council model. It has been revised (and improved!) after
having given evidence to the hearing of the Republic Inquiry of the Senate
Legal and Constitutional Committee on
» Part
I: a comprehensive description of
the model
» Part
II: a draft Constitution
implementing the model
A five page summary is also
available (in Microsoft Powerpoint format).
This summarises the proposed constitutional framework, the powers of the
President, the Constitutional Council and the Speaker, the method of election
of the President and a number of other key features of the model.
» Summary
Models should be tested against
a set of quality criteria, with a useful baseline being our current
constitutional arrangements.
Here’s a set of basic criteria which I’ve done my best to
meet with my model:
Ø
A
constitutional vacuum should not occur under any circumstances.
Ø
A
constitutional deadlock or stalemate should not occur under any circumstances.
Ø
Opportunities
for a Mexican stand-off should be minimised or eliminated. I.e., There should be no possibility of a
situation where two officers can simultaneously use (or threaten to use) the
same power to the detriment of the other at. E.g., under the 1998 referendum
model, the Prime Minister and the President could equally threaten the other
with dismissal.
Ø
No
more power should be vested in the Prime Minister than under current
arrangements.
Ø
No
more power vested in the executive government than under current arrangements.
Ø
There
should be no fewer checks and balances than under current arrangements.
Ø
Checks
and balances in the model should not be excessive or onerous to the extent that
they impair the effective functioning of government.
Ø
Implementation
of the doctrine of the separation of powers should not be compromised.
Ø
The
unifying mechanisms and symbols of the federation should not be weakened.
Ø
The
Head of State should not be a rival centre of executive power to the executive
government, especially to the extent that it threatens or impairs the normal
functioning of executive government.
Ø
No
conflict of interest should arise in any constitutional processes.
Ø
Elected
representatives should be no less accountable to the people than under current
arrangements, and should not be able to avoid accountability.
Ø
Democratic
principles should be observed in the selection of the head of state.
Ø
The
cost of the system is determinable and acceptable.
If you’d like to contact me, please email me at petergc@hotpop.com. I’d love to hear your comments and criticisms!