THE
PHILOSOPHY OF DEATH :
Attached: notes from Fr. Dave Hawe,
lecturer in Philosophy, Banyo Seminary, c 1968;
See also: chapter on death from John Macquarrie, In Search
of Humanity.
Nagel, What
does it all mean? chapter on death, or from Mortal Questions.
James Foley, “‘...Now and at the Hour of Our Death’:
Philosophizing on Dying”, in Banyo Studies,
edited Neil J. Byrne (Pius XII Seminary, Banyo,
1991), pp. 291-312.
The classic 20th C. text is probably
that of Heidegger, Being and Time, on
human being as, among other things, Being-Towards-Death (see below). But there have been philosophical meditations
on death since the beginning of philosophizing: see notes from D. Hawe for some references.
Some possible philosophies of death and dying:
1.
Death is an interruption to life, like
sleep or disease, only permanent. Life
is to be lived in spite of it. It is the
end of our projects, an interference with them, not something to be integrated. This would be the case for both ourselves and
those we love.
Two attitudes are then possible: (a) ignore it,
and live life in spite of it; or
(b) rebellion: "rage, rage, rage, against the
dying of the light" (Dylan Thomas). Cf., in D. Hawe's
notes, Sartre p. 3, Pascal, Nietzsche and Epicurus, p. 6, for the first; and Camus, p. 7 for the second.
2.
Death or rather dying ought to be considered, rather as the culminating act of life,
in which a person expresses who s/he is, what they stand for, what his/her life
is all about. This might happen in two
ways:
2(a) via the circumstances of the death or by the
manner of dying or both: an external and internal expression of what their life
is all about. E.g. Jesus, Socrates, the
martyrs.
2(b) Whatever about the outer circumstances and
perceivable manner of death, death provides for all an opportunity for an
internal expression of what they are all about, a "final option"
ratifying their "fundamental option" or perhaps modifying it, this
being part of dying. Cf. K. Rahner, Theology of Death.
3.
Death is to be considered as part of life, something which every person has to come to terms with, in order to
live well, part of what is involved in accepting our finitude. In Heidegger's language, human being is
being-towards-death, this is one of the existentialia
of Dasein, one of the structural features of human
existence as such, which has to be assumed if we are to live authentically (cf.
Heidegger, notes p. 7).[1] Cf. also Lochet
in the notes, p. 8: "...no one becomes truly adult unless he assumes and
accepts his birth and his death; for to be truly a [human being] one must
accept the human condition..."
Also Hegel, notes, p. 9.
4.
Death is to be considered as a transition from this life to the life that really counts, eternal life.
This latter is usually conceived in terms of a
soul surviving the body, via a view in the West going back to Plato; but a kind
of immediate resurrection as postulated by Schillebeeckx,
David Coffey and others is also
conceivable. Whatever, it's the next
life that counts, and death is not something to be feared, at least not for
those who die in the grace of God. Like
a butterfly shedding its cocoon.
(But in traditional religiosity, unfortunately, there
is also hell and suchlike, and frequently in the popular imagination and
popular preaching in the past most people will end up there --which can
sometimes make even 1, which is either agnostic or negative in respect of an
afterlife, more acceptable. Cf. Hume, Dialogues
XII.)
5.
As with 4, but taking away
the idea that this life is for the sake of the next one, only some kind of
trial, in so far as this tends to devalue this life (= the 'porch' view of life). Eternal life starts here and now, the
6.
Death is to be considered as
a transition from this life eventually to
another life of much the same kind, better or worse according to one's
deeds (karma): doctrines of re-incarnation.
Like 4 above, but not quite so final: we'll get another chance to do it
right. This sometimes combines with views
like 4: re-incarnation as the wheel of re-birth, final salvation = to get off
the wheel of rebirth. See below for more details.
Questions:
1. What is your experience of other people's
attitude to death and dying?
2. Which of the above is closest to your own
present (existential, actual) philosophy of death?
3. Which of the above would you prefer as your
philosophy of death?
For what reasons?
(Combinations also possible.)
4. Is the above listing a good one? Are there
other possibilities? If so, what are
they?
5. The status of famous stages of dying
"denial, anger, bargaining, depression, acceptance" (Elizabeth Kubler-Ross): could
this (psychological, medical, pastoral phenomenon) be a basis for philosophical
generalization?
6. The significance of near-death experiences: cf.
Psyche and Spirit, edited Heaney.
Also
What about near-other-people's-death
experiences? Do the resurrection
appearances of Christ fit into this category (as a kind of extreme version
thereof, perhaps)?
Note on
PHILOSOPHY AS AN 'EXERCISE IN DYING'
This
is a notion going back as far as Socrates/Plato, in Plato's Dialogues, esp. the Phaedo. Philosophy does not just meditate on death and
immortality. Nor does it just prepare a
person psychologically to face his or her own death or that of others, and just
as importantly to put this life together in the light of death. Philosophizing itself is a little bit like
dying, an escape from the bodily, mundane world into the world of the spirit,
the world of Ideas. We live for a while
'for the things which are above, rather than the things which are below'. We learn here and now to practice for later
on. This will shape us, ontologically even,
and help to determine our fate in the world that is to come. Philosophizing, then, is one long preparation
for dying, an engagement, in the manner of an athlete, in an 'exercise in
dying', a MELETE THANATOU.
Such
a notion of an intellectual yoga as a salvific path
in its own right is by no means confined to Western philosophy (and the ‘Western’ monastic and spiritual
tradition). It relates to the Jnana and Raja Yogas (the Way of
Knowledge, the Way of Meditation) in the Hindu and Buddhist traditions - versus
or in addition to Karma Yoga (the Way of Action) or Bhakti
Yoga (the Way of Devotion). The origin
in the 'West' is the Pythagorean brother/sisterhood in philosophy, from there
to Plato and the Platonic and Neo-Platonic tradition.
THE
QUESTION OF IMMORTALITY (to be taken in association
with notes on Death and Dying, Minds and Bodies, and Personal Identity.)
It is possible to philosophize about Death while
bracketing the question of a life after death (see Heidegger). However, they are frequently closely
associated, and in any case the possibility of life after death (or life after
life) is worthy of consideration in its own right.
SOME POSSIBILITIES:
1. The soul dies with the body,
no personal or 'subjective' survival after death. At the most 'objective immortality' = the continuing difference my life as
remembered or recorded makes or the continued existence of the difference my
life made to the universe and other human beings (e.g. my friends, spouse,
children, but more widely also) and also to God. This is the view of the process philosopher
Charles Hartshorne: he thinks this is all we need or could reasonably want, to
make an eternal contribution to the life of God; anything more than this is selfish.
2. Re-incarnation: not only in Eastern religions esp. Hinduism but also for example in
Pythagoras, Plato and some of the Platonic tradition including the church
'father' Origen.
The soul or innermost self does not die but continues its career in
another person or sometimes in a lesser form of life. Re-birth.
This is not always considered a 'good thing': the whole idea of religion
for the major Indian religions is to get off the wheel of re-birth = e.g. the
Buddhist nirvana. This distinguishes the
Indian religions from New Age: in Hinduism and Buddhism, reincarnation is
assumed background, part of life as suffering, from which the religions save
us. Sometimes the getting off the wheel
takes the form of immortality, 3 below.
This is the case in the Platonic tradition: philosophizing as a way of
getting off the wheel of rebirth into genuine immortality.
What can be said for it: (i)
It is probably the most widely believed of all the possibilities; (ii) it
emphasizes the togetherness of all life; (iii) there are certain claimed
experiences in favour of it, e.g. memories of
previous lives; (iv) it makes for an easily conceivable notion of an after-life,
with karma, for the most part, replacing apparent memory.
3. The
immortality of the soul by itself: the soul continues on, in
heaven or hell or purgatory and/or in some kind of tenuous relationship with
this world, after the demise of the body, and without any other body. This is usually considered as a 'good thing',
escaping the prison of the body etc.
Thus as in the classic, Greco-Roman Christian worldview and
spirituality, in spite of the creeds.
But sometimes it is considered as pretty dismal at its best, cf. Humanity
and the After Life, article by E.G. Miller.
In this case, the effect may be not much different from 1, above: either
way, it is this life which counts. Cf.
the early Hebrews and the Greeks of Homer's time.
4. The
resurrection of the body on the last day: with or
without a belief in the immortality of the soul as well, to span the
intervening period. This is the doctrine
of the Christian creeds, rather than immortality of the soul, and follows on,
perhaps helps to form, the belief in the resurrection of Christ. It includes an affirmation of the body, and
indeed of this world, as something worth saving, not just destroying. Though not necessarily to be saved exactly as
they are: salvation includes
transformation.
One
(philosophical) difficulty with 'last day' resurrection is maintaining personal
identity across the intervening period, between death e.g. at
5. The
immediate resurrection of the body, with full salvation however
still awaiting the salvation of all other people and of the cosmos 'on the last
day': David Coffey and others. This
solves the previously noted problem of maintaining identity, but requires us to
sophisticate our notion of the resurrection of the body. This often goes with the view that the empty
tomb was a valuable sign or a symbol of the resurrection of Jesus rather than a
pre-condition or necessary condition for it.
One problem with it is to explain how, if at all,
it differs from regular immortality: how to avoid sophisticating the body out
of existence.
DISCUSSION: in the context of related issues.
Apart from near-death experiences and claimed experiences of ghosts
etc., it is very difficult to discuss anything on this question in isolation. Even empirical evidence which might conduce
one to be sympathetic requires to be contextualized in some agreeable ontology
or epistemology or religious vision in order to be properly interpreted and
evaluated.
(A) Death
and Dying and Immortality (please
refer to previous notes)
Views
1-3 on death and dying are all consistent with agnosticism on the question of
an afterlife and that 2 and 3 as well as 1 are probably consistent with a negative answer to the question. 1 is
not easily reconciliable with a positive answer to
the question. If it were more probable
than not both that (a) there was an afterlife and (b) what we did in this life
determined the quality of the afterlife, both our own and that of the people we
affected, then a sensible person would need to build particularly this latter
fact (b) into his or her life projects.
One could still engage in denial, but this would no longer be a
reasonable thing to do.
But
this issue of what attitude is appropriate, given the (probable or possible)
facts, does not determine what these facts are.
So the relationship between the issues seems to go in one direction
only.
What is probable in the way
of 'facts' depends on at least the following two further contexts, and for
philosophers at least to some extent on a third, the problem of personal
identity.
(B) Immortality
and Belief in God
·
A doctrine of some kind of
subjective or personal afterlife is re-enforced by belief in God. As in the Book of Job and varied other places
in the Scriptures, the giving of the Divine Mystery has given people grounds
for hope.
·
On the other hand, belief in
God does not necessarily imply that one should believe in a subjective or
personal afterlife. Compare the
philosopher Charles Hartshorne, also the early Hebrews, who had very vague ideas
on an afterlife. Hartshorne and others
distinguish between
(a) objective immortality: my life as making a contribution to
other people and to the universe, and even to the life of God, this lasting
beyond my death; and
(b) subjective immortality:
the above, plus a continuation of the life of the same subject or person after
death, to which the quality of this life contributes.
For Hartshorne, (b) is a bit selfish and also
unlikely, and we both can and should be content with (a). (But it need not necessarily be selfish: we
may desire the continuation of those we love for their sakes.)
Enclosing two articles from the tradition of
process thinking, by David Griffin (in favour of
subjective immortality), the other by Jan Van der Veken (more sceptical). You need a 'metaphysics' which allows it,
plus empirical evidence in favour of it. But some of this evidence is in the way of
"particular experience of particular people", not capable of service
in a philosophical discussion, more in the way of religious faith or theology
(possibly still reasonable for those in the experience-interpretation
tradition).
(C) Minds
and Bodies and Immortality
This cross-over of philosophical anthropology with
ontology tends to be the key, determining issue for philosophers.
In respect of views about minds and bodies,
1) 'dualism'
is not only consistent with 'immortality of the soul' but constitutes an
argument in favour of it. In more extreme versions (both Plato and
Descartes) however it makes 'resurrection of the body' not so easy to see the
point of. Why get a body back if it is
such a bother?
2) 'emergentist interactionism'
and classic Whitehead-Hartshorne Process
theory make immortality of the soul/mind conceivable (in some versions only
just conceivable). But they do not imply
it and do not by themselves constitute evidence in favour
of it. The question is whether the
mental series which we (largely) are will be able to continue under its own
steam, so to speak, once there is no further input from brain and body and
other people and rest of the world? Or, alternatively, whether there is or will
be sufficient input of other kinds (and output as well), perhaps even
facilitated in their effect by the demise of the normal intense input (and
output) from the brain? See
Resurrection of the body (or of something to perform
the personal functions of the body) fits in fairly well: even if there is
subjective immortality, continuation of the same stream of consciousness or
awareness, it is not exactly the normal way for a human being to be.
3) dual
aspect identity theories and Merleau-Ponty's
body-subject idea are consistent with some God-provided resurrection from
the dead but not with doctrines of the immortality of the soul. If mind and brain or mind and body are two
aspects or properties of the one thing, when one goes the other goes, or at
least it is hard to see how it wouldn't.
Even given hope in an entirely God-provided
resurrection, there may be some difficulties in maintaining personal identity
between death and 'the last day' e.g. distinguishing a resurrection from the
creation of 'another' person with the same memories; but perhaps such
difficulties can be got over (cf. Peter Forest in Humanity and the After
Life, edited Moses and Ormerod). Also this is no such problem for David
Coffey's idea of an immediate resurrection after death.
(D) Personal
Identity and Immortality
How 'personal identity' is rightly to be conceived
will determine the possibilities for maintaining personal identity across death
and after death. The problem of personal
identity is a very complicated business however and a classic philosophical
problem in its own right.
As
noted above, there are two main families of theories, 'substance' theories and
'bundle' theories (see above), each capable of taking a variety of forms in the
context of the problem of death and life after death. The following is a massive simplification:
SUBSTANCE
THEORIES:
Premissed on a 'substance - accidents' metaphysics, reality consisting in enduring
things with various properties causally interacting with other things.
1. Dualist interactionism, plus the notion of human beings as
'substantially' their soul or mind, a substance in its own right in causal
interaction with a body. As long as this
particular 'soul' or 'mind' substance continues in existence, there is the same
person. This provides an apparently
quite simple resolution to personal identity problems across death and after
death. But cf. Peter Forrest's story in Humanity and the After Life.
2. Hylomorphism: human being as one substance, soul and body,
with soul as the 'form' of the body.
Thomistic Hylomorphism: soul as 'subsistent form'. The soul in the intervening period is not a
human person but the formal principle of a human person, a fundamentally
incomplete substance though still continuing to exist. Resurrection = this same self-identical form
coming to inform a different piece of matter, perhaps also with a different
sense of 'inform' than in this life.
Difference of matter however is not significant any more than in this life,
and the mode of 'informing' may well be regarded as an improvement.
Problem of
3. Dual
aspect identity theories: a human being as one single substance with two
aspects or sets of properties, mental and physical. Presumably both have to be maintained in
order to maintain personal identity?? But
how do you do that across death?? By
something which is still technically an 'accidental' if still quite drastic,
change, rather than a 'substantial' change which would bring into existence a
new substance. Like caterpillars turning
into butterflies. This may well require
an immediate resurrection doctrine.
BUNDLE
THEORIES
The human mind as a bundle of events, connected
together by relationships of resemblance and causality. Compare Hume and also Buddhism and
contemporary Process Philosophy: no soul, self, or substance underlying the
events on which the events are strung or of which the events are properties, no
string, just the beads. This bundle
causally interacts with, perhaps is originally emergent from, perhaps
'embedded' in (J. Searle) various material events or perhaps a material
substance called a body, itself interacting with an external environment. This view goes well with but probably does
not require an Event metaphysics.
See my article in Humanity and the After Life for the conditions under which such a
bundle theory might be made consistent with personal salvation in an after
life. A lot depends on how one relates
such a bundle to personal identity this side of death. It is certainly an important factor,
providing a base for personal identity, but without exhausting the notion. The end result may be rather similar to Thomistic hylomorphism:
continuation of the same bundle, i.e. strong relations of causality and
resemblance, the continuation of the same mental series, may be sufficient to
ensure survival and the maintainance of continuity
sufficient for identity, without the intervening 'mind-bundle' being sufficient
for description as a human person. In
that case personal salvation would still require some kind of resurrection but
it could be after an intervening period.
QUESTIONS
1. Can you
believe in immortality without believing in God? Can you believe in God without believing in
immortality? [For Christian theologians:
Can you believe in the Christian God without believing in immortality? Without believing in the resurrection of the
dead? Without believing in both??]
2. Does
dualism provide the only possible basis for a purely natural survival after
death? What about emergent interactionism?
3. Context:
Star Trek, "beam me up, Scottie", type technology.
(a) Usual Star Trek: Does the person still exist
in the intervening moments?
What if the intervening moments = years or even
decades, as in a recent Star Trek: The Next Generation, episode? Does the length of time make a
difference? Does this help with Resurrection
from the Dead on the Last Day type problems?
(b) Variation: for interplanetary travel it
becomes cheaper and less dangerous not to send the entire mass across the
intervening space, just to send the information necessary to reconstitute the
person on the other side.
(i) is it still the same
person?
(ii) In the usual case, let us say, the
person/body on the transmission side is destroyed at the self-same time they
arrive on the other, receiving side so that there is temporal continuity but no
temporal overlap. Is this murder?
(iii) Something goes wrong and the person/body on
the transmitting side is not destroyed or destroyed only later, with temporal
overlap. Do you now have two people with
the same name and memories? Which is the
original Captain Kirk (= his original name)?
Is the other really Captain Kirk or just a new creation, with the
memories of Captain Kirk as on star date 47731, 2.00 p.m. the time of original
transmission, and a genetically identical body, also in case (ii)?
(iv) Why should not sending the mass matter (if
you think it does), if you change your mass every seven years anyway?
THE QUESTION OF LIFE AFTER DEATH: Overheads
POSSIBILITIES:
1. the soul dies
with the body, no personal or 'subjective' survival after
death. At the most 'objective
immortality'.
2. re-incarnation: not only in Eastern religions esp. Hinduism but also for example in
Pythagoras, Plato and some of the Platonic tradition including the church
'father' Origen.
Not a good thing, not a salvation doctrine
(usually): assumed background, with salvation = getting off the wheel of
rebirth, via various different methods and to various different goals, e.g.
nirvana, absorption into the Absolute, genuine immortality of the soul by
itself.
3. the immortality
of the soul by itself:
This is usually considered as a 'good thing',
escaping the prison of the body etc. But
sometimes it is considered as pretty dismal at its best.
4. the resurrection
of the body on the last day: with or without a belief in
the immortality of the soul as well, to span the intervening period.
One
(philosophical) difficulty with 'last day' resurrection is maintaining personal
identity across the intervening period, between death and the last day.
5. the immediate
resurrection of the body, with full salvation however
still awaiting the salvation of all other people and of the cosmos 'on the last
day'
DISCUSSION: in the context of related issues. It is very difficult to discuss anything on
this question in isolation.
(A) Death and Dying and Immortality
(please refer to previous notes)
(B) Immortality and Belief in God
A doctrine of some kind of subjective or personal
afterlife is reenforced by belief in God.
On the other hand, belief in God does not
necessarily imply that one should believe in a subjective or personal
afterlife. Compare the philosopher
Charles Hartshorne, also the early Hebrews, who had very vague ideas on an
afterlife. Hartshorne and others
distinguish between
(a)objective immortality: my life as making
a contribution to other people and to the universe, and even to the life of
God, this lasting beyond my death; and
(b)subjective immortality: the above, plus
a continuation of the life of the same subject or person after death, to which
the quality of this life contributes.
For Hartshorne, (b) is a bit selfish and also
unlikely, and we both can and should be content with (a). (But it need not necessarily be selfish: we
may desire the continuation of those we love for their sakes.)
(C) Minds and Bodies and Immortality
In respect of views about minds and bodies,
1) 'dualism' is not only consistent with
'immortality of the soul' but constitutes an argument in favour
of it. In more extreme versions (both
Plato and Descartes) however it makes 'resurrection of the body' not so easy to
see the point of. Why get a body back if
it is such a bother?
2) 'emergentist interactionism' and classic Whitehead-Hartshorne Process
theory make immortality of the soul/mind conceivable but do not imply it and do
not by themselves constitute evidence in favour of
it.
Resurrection of the body fits in fairly well.
3) dual aspect identity theories and Merleau-Ponty's body-subject idea are consistent with some
God-provided resurrection from the dead but not with doctrines of the
immortality of the soul.
(D) Personal Identity and Immortality
How 'personal identity' is rightly to be conceived
will determine the possibilities for maintaining personal identity across death
and after death.
SUBSTANCE
THEORIES:
Premissed on a 'substance - accidents' metaphysics, reality consisting in enduring
things with various properties causally interacting with other things.
1. Dualist interactionism, plus the notion of human beings as
'substantially' their soul or mind, a substance in its own right in causal
interaction with a body. As long as this
particular 'soul' or 'mind' substance continues in existence, there is the same
person. This provides an apparently
quite simple resolution to personal identity problems across death and after
death.
2. Hylomorphism: human being as one substance, soul and body,
with soul as the 'form' of the body.
Thomistic Hylomorphism: soul as 'subsistent form'. The soul in the intervening period is not a
human person but the formal principle of a human person, a fundamentally
incomplete substance though still continuing to exist. Resurrection = this same self-identical form
coming to inform a different piece of matter, perhaps also with a different
sense of 'inform' than in this life.
3. Dual
aspect identity theories: a human being as one single substance with two
aspects or sets of properties, mental and physical. Presumably both have to be maintained in
order to maintain personal identity??
But how do you do that across death??
By something which is still technically an 'accidental' if still quite
drastic, change, rather than a 'substantial' change which would bring into
existence a new substance. Like
caterpillars turning into butterflies.
This may well require an immediate resurrection doctrine.
BUNDLE
THEORIES
The human mind as a bundle of events, connected
together by relationships of resemblance and causality. Compare Hume and also Buddhism and
contemporary Process Philosophy: no soul, self, or substance underlying the
events on which the events are strung or of which the events are properties, no
string, just the beads. Immortality =
continuation of the same causally connected bundle of mental events, beyond the
death of the body. This however is not
exactly a normal state for a human being to be in: cf. Thomistic
Hylomorphism.
[1]. For more on Heidegger, see Being
and Time (Blackwell, Oxford, 1973), Division Two, I, pp. 279-311. Division One gives an analysis of human
existence in its average everydayness.
Division Two delineates the passage out of the scattering of everyday or
inauthentic existence, made possible among other things (the main other thing
being the phenomenon of conscience) by the fact that Dasein
is Being-unto-Death, and my death at least is inelectibly
mine. Death: Dasein's ownmost
possibility, which is non-relational and cannot be outstripped. Which is to say that death makes one take
ones life seriously.
This awareness of myself as a being
towards death takes the form of anxiety or dread, Angst, one of
the moods: I'm not anxious about
anything in particular; what is causing the anxiety or dread is the fundamental
finitude of my existence as such or as a whole, its transcient
character, through and through finite, threatened with annulment. This anxiety, this awareness of my mortality,
brought on by this or that event, we try to escape, we flee from it. But it does allow a space for the phenomenon
of conscience to work: "conscience summons Dasein's
self from its lostness in the 'they'" --not
everyday conscience, the internalized voice of society, the super-ego in
Freudian terms, which can immerse us all the more deeply in average
everydayness; but the summons which I give to myself as the being who cares
about its own being. Authentic
existence, under the call of conscience, is to resolutely assume my
finitude and the possibility of death, freely, with lucidity, and to put my
life together sub specie mortis.