The Problem of Evil: Index
§1. Problems of Evil
§2. The Consistency/Compatibility Problems
§3. Response of Classical Theism
§4. Neo-Classical/Process on the Problem of Evil
§5. The Inference Problem
§6. The A-teleological Argument
§7. Some final issues
The Problem of Evil: 1. Problems of evil
§Practical versus Theoretical
§Everyone has the practical, Theists also have theoretical difficulties, I.e. reconciling their experience of evil with their faith in an all powerful and all good God
§Physical Evil versus Moral Evil: moral evil as both part of the problem and an element in some proposed ‘solutions’
The Problem of Evil: 1. Problems of evil: the theoretical
problems
§The Consistency or Compatibility Problems
§whether the existence of evil/ the experienced amount of evil is consistent with the existence of an all powerful and all good God
§The Inference Problem:
§whether we could infer the goodness of God from our experience of the world, with its evils.
§The Inductive A-teleological Argument:
§arguing from evil to the non-existence of God
The Problem of Evil: 1. Problems of evil: the theoretical
problems
§Rather than consider evil and suffering as a problem for religion, one may conceive it as something which religion is about solving
§Cf. esp. the example of Buddhism
§But also the tradition of Liberation Theology
§This may also mean renovating our theology of God: what does God have to be like in order to be liberating??
The Problem of Evil:
3. Classical Theism
§(a) First major move: the Free Will Defense
§I.e. God cannot be held blame-able for the evil which human beings freely originate, which evil God allows for the sake of a greater good, namely human freedom.
§Even as Creator of all God escapes responsibility, since evil is privation, not something positive.
The Problem of Evil:
3. Classical Theism (cont’d)
§Free Will Defense faces some problems
§(i) not everyone thinks evil is a privation. Cf. Hick, Process Thinkers
§(ii) couldn’t God have made creatures who always freely do the right thing?
§Various answers have been tried for question (ii), namely: 1)yes, but God didn’t have to; 2) yes, but what God has done is better; and 3) No, infallible freedom is a contradiction.
The Problem of Evil:
3. Classical Theism (cont’d)
§(b) Second major move: extend the Free Will defense to cover much of the suffering that afflicts humans and nature, by talk of Original Sin and the fall of angels etc.
§A breakdown in the relationship God-humanity leads to breakdown in the relationships with others and with nature
§= the Augustinian tradition, following Paul: Creation, Fall, Redemption, Salvation
The Problem of Evil:
3. Classical Theism (cont’d)
§(b) Second major move (cont’d):
§This makes some sense. The only problem is whether we should blame it all on poor old Adam and/or Eve.
§Others prefer
the Irenaean tradition, the educational paradigm,
also Pauline (Gal.
The Problem of Evil:
3. Classical Theism (cont’d)
§(c) Further move: The Rule of General Law argument: no walking without gravity, but once we have gravity we can fall down steps.
§(d) Final move: finite free will, even when good intentioned, inevitably operates in ignorance of all the facts and all the values at stake. I.e. even in a perfect world with perfect people, still a problem.
The Problem of Evil:
4. Process Theisms
§(a) First move: redefine
Omnipotence (
§The perfection of power as cosmically available persuasive, responsive love, rather than determination of everything behind the scene. Creation = persuasion.
The Problem of Evil:
4. Process Theisms (cont’d)
§(b)
Second move: extension of creativity and initiative effectively to all of
creation: I.e. we move from a Free Will Defense to a Free Process
Defense.
§Everything has a little bit of creativity, makes its own, sometimes small, contribution.
§(Process people not the only ones to do this. Cf. Polkinghorne, Nancey Murphy also)
The Problem of Evil:
4. Process Theisms (cont’d)
§(c) Third Move: reject creatio ex nihilo, in favour of creation out of chaos. Cf. esp. Catherine Keller.
§But usually they are careful not to ascribe evil to chaos - evil comes from too much order as well as too much chaos; the proper relation is as in Genesis: the Spirit hovering over the Waters. The Spirit as ‘tehomophilic’ rather than ‘tehomophobic’.
The Problem of Evil:
4. Process Theisms (cont’d)
§(d) A further consideration is in respect of a variety of places for evil to derive from:
§much evil is disorder, disharmony, rather than privation
§there is just as much evil in the other direction, however: overpowering order, too much order, order of the wrong kind.
The Problem of Evil:
4. Process Theisms (cont’d)
§(d) cont’d: where evil comes from
§some of these evils result from the creativity and initiative of created agents, deliberately introduced into the drama, so to speak
§but some evils are in fact no one’s fault, the unpredictable result of different initiatives.
§The divine creative-responsive love remains as a cosmically available Lure, but does not and cannot fully determine the process
The Problem of Evil:
4. Process Theisms (cont’d)
§(e) there has also been a quite powerful recovery in process theology lately of the tradition of Original Sin.
§Original sin = a deeply embedded almost inescapable corruption in the relational process in which we are all immersed.
§See
esp. Marjorie Suchocki, The Fall to Violence
(Continuum, N.Y. 1999)
The Problem of Evil:
4. Process Theisms (cont’d)
§There is some argument among process people on the eschatology, as to whether the Reign of God will be triumphant in the end.
§Most process people put this into the realm of hope rather than knowledge: a well grounded hope, perhaps.
§It is also possible to develop a Hick like solution to the problem
The Problem of Evil:
4. Process Theisms (cont’d)
§Some Problems with the Process Vision:
§1) compatible with some evil, but with the amount of evil??
§2) Is this a God that can be adored?
§3) Does this God have enough control to function as a Ground of Hope? There seems to be too much contingency in the Process...
The Problem of Evil:
5: the Inference Problem of Evil
§Whether, relying only on commonly available experience, we could infer from the universe with all its ambiguity that God was good…
§Probably not: commonly available experience would be equally consistent with a neutral God or the existence of two Principles, one good and one evil.
The Problem of Evil: 5: the Inference Problem of Evil (con’d
§Commonly available experience enough to justify belief that the Giving of Being is intelligent, and perhaps has a feeling for an austure, non-anthropocentric species of beauty and good in an austere kind of way
§The conviction that the Giving of Being is gracious, and Holy, and a Lure in our lives to goodness, truth and beauty, is probably based on more particular experiences.
The Problem of Evil 6: The A-teleological Argument
§This is a kind of reversal of the classic Argument from Design
§Whether, given instances of apparently gratuitous suffering (Bambi in the forest fire) certain people might even build a good probable argument against the existence of an all good God
§This argument is independent of the consistency problem.
The Problem of Evil 6: The A-teleological Argument
(cont’d)
§But some of the considerations for establishing consistency also relevant here.
§Compare esp. Mark Wynn’s ecological theodicy
§One of the consequences of this and the Inference Problem, however, is that we may have to become rather less anthropocentric in our interpretation of Divine Goodness...
The Problem of Evil 7: Final Issues
§(a) What does the universe have to be like in order to preserve the goodness of God?
§1) has to be the best logically possible world (cf. Leibniz).
§But is there a best for God?
§2) has at least to be good in the last resort, and such that God is not directly responsible for the evil
§but is this good enough??
The Problem of Evil 7: Some final issues
§(a) What does the universe have to be like in order to preserve the goodness of God? (cont’d)
§3) has to be the best possible world for the purpose for which God created it, as implicit in the kind of world it is.
§Cf. Hick, who thinks this rules out a populated, everlasting Hell.
The Problem of Evil 7: Some final issues (cont’d)
§(b) the existence of a populated, everlasting Hell in a universe created and presided over by an all powerful and all good God
§An everlasting Hell populated by the majority or even a large minority of sentient, rational creatures, probably creates fatal problems for any theodicy:
§even if we solve the logical problem, the Divine ‘goodness’ would be emotionally irrelevant.
The Problem of Evil 7: Some final issues (cont’d)
§(d) Hell as an issue in theodicy (cont’d)
§a more ‘moderate’ doctrine might conceivably survive, but even it would face severe problems: none of the arguments for it make much sense
§What needs to be preserved: we are never forced to love, we don’t have to say yes. But this is our problem, not God’s: the ‘gulf’ is of our own making...
The Problem of Evil 7: Some final issues (cont’d)
§(d) Hell as an issue in theodicy (cont’d)
§There are some interesting alternatives: e.g. John Scotus Eriugena’s idea that we will all be in heaven, the final reign of God, but that some will enjoy it more than others, and people who persevere in getting their kicks out of being nasty to other people will find themselves eternally frustrated...