LEIBNIZ, Gottfried Wilhelm von
Born
German philosopher, diplomat, ecumenist, master
mathematician (co-inventor of the calculus, independently of Newton), scientist
(founder of the Berlin Academy of Sciences), inventor (of a rather
sophisticated calculating machine, improving on that of Pascal), precursor of
symbolic logic (with his idea of a 'mathesis universalis'), rediscoverer of
the binary system of numbers (found first in Thomas Harriot,
died 1621). The great,
great grandparent of the computer age.
Some of his
writings:
Discourse
on Metaphysics (1686)
New System
of Nature (1695-96)
New Essays
on Human Understanding (1703-04)
Essays on
Theodicy: On the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Human Beings and the Origin of
Evil (1710)
Monadology (1714)
Principles
of Nature and Grace (1714)
Like Descartes, he wrote in both Latin and French.
1.
.From Leibniz: two key
principles, the Principle of
Contradiction, and the Principle of
Sufficient Reason, = "nothing exists but that a reason can be given -
at least by an omniscient mind - why it should be rather than not be, and why
it should be thus rather than otherwise".
'Reason', in the sense of
logically sufficient reason.
Implication: God had to have a reason for creating this world rather than some other
world, so this has to be the best of all
possible worlds.
2.
Leibniz (versus
Space and time are different kinds of orderings of
things, Space = simultaneous or independent ordering, Time = successive or
dependent ordering.
Leibniz entered into quite a heated controversy with
3.
These things, whose orderings
constitute space and time, are what Leibniz calls monads or simples:
'Monads', from the Greek monos, alone; simples, in the sense of what the Universe
and everything in it are composed of.
About these monads:
·
Each monad is an expression
or mirror or representation of the whole universe, from a particular unique
viewpoint, some parts more or less clearly expressed than others. [Which is to say, for
Leibniz everything at least looks like
it is related to everything else --but see below.]
·
The Universe or whole of
course is not static but a dynamic process;
·
This dynamism of the whole is
also represented in every monad, which is therefore characterized by a continuous
change or succession of perceptions
or expressions,
but in such a way that these changes in fact express the dynamism proper to every monad in particular.
:every
monad is a 'living force', a substance capable of action, characterized by 'appetitions' or an element of striving, which as with
perceptions however does not have to be conscious.
W.r.t. 'perceptions' including 'appetitions': the
analogy is with human perception -- the word in Leibniz doesn't imply
consciousness, even in humans admits of degrees of consciousness, the conscious
ones are only the tip of the iceberg.
·
These monads, in spite of the
above, are really distinct from each other, separate substances, each existing
in itself dynamically, each doing its own thing, 'window-less'.
·
How can each one then
express, from a particular viewpoint, not only a few other monads e.g. those
constituting my body, but the whole universe?
This is the work of God, 'pre-established harmony', like two clocks wound up to keep time
with each other, without ever having to influence each other: God in our language is like a mighty programmer
of a universe consisting of continuously but totally independently developing
monads. S/he has programmed it all so
that they all co-ordinate with each other.
(Leibniz the inventor of a rather sophisticated
calculating machine, capable of multiplying and dividing, raising to the nth
power, extracting the root.)
Something like this notion of monads crops up
again in some Process thinkers, e.g. Whitehead and Hartshorne and their
followers. Process actual entities
however are no longer window-less.
According to the process people, Leibniz is caught by the definition of
'substance' which he inherits: substance as what needs nothing else besides
itself (and perhaps God) either to exist or to be conceived. Also by subject-predicate logic, which itself
helps to motivate the definition of substance, together with a certain concept
of 'truth': a true proposition as one whose predicate is contained in the
subject. What are you/am I? All the truths about you/me
from birth to death. Everything
is just a playing out of what I am or you are, but so programmed as to
co-ordinate with and seemingly reflect the playings
out of everything else. Leibniz, then,
is a typical rationalist, consistently following what appears to him to be
rationally required, wherever this goes.
4.
Another principle which comes
from Leibniz is the Principle of the
Identity of Indiscernables: two things precisely
similar to each other in all respects are in fact the same thing.
--implied in the idea that each monad is
essentially a particular viewpoint on the universe as a whole: any other monad
occupying that same viewpoint (= the same in every respect) is in fact the same
monad.
--also implied in the idea of the relativity of
space and time: you can't have purely numerical differences, you can't have the
same thing except for space and time, because space and time is a recording or
trace of a difference already there among the things, not something in which
the things are.