John Rawls: His Political Philosophy
A Theory
of Justice (1971)
Political
Liberalism (1993)
Background
bJohn Rawls = Harvard Professor, now Emeritus
bA philosopher in the analytic tradition
bBut aware of and knowledgeable about past
political philosophy, esp. Locke, Rousseau and Kant, but not excluding e.g.
Aristotle.
bVery sophisticated and highly academic
Rawls and the Social Contract Tradition
bRawls places himself squarely within the social
contract tradition of Locke, Rousseau and Kant
bThe difficulty with previous formulations,
however, is that what the social contract gives rise to seems
to be sensitive to the social situatedness of the
political philosopher and the bargaining parties.
Rawls and
the Social Contract Tradition (cont’d)
bRawls solves this problem by posing that the
contract is as if made behind a ‘veil of ignorance’
bThis negates the situatedness
of the parties and makes the outcome just in the sense of fair to all
concerned.
bIt thus achieves a state of affairs which
everyone should be able to live with and freely co-operate in...
The Original Position behind the ‘veil of
ignorance’
bNo one is to know their place in society, class
position or social status (TJ 12), nor their race or
skin colour (TJ 149) or sex or gender (TJ 149 PL 25),
as also their natural talents and psychological propensities.
bAlso behind the veil of ignorance: ones
conception of the good (TJ) or comprehensive doctrine of what life is all about
(PL) (these will differ in real life)
The
Original Position behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ (cont’d)
bPeople are regarded as rational and mutually
disinterested, I.e. not concerned with other people’s particular concerns,
though they may well be concerned for other people.
bNot behind the veil of ignorance: an equal
desire for certain primary social goods, such as rights and liberties, income,
and the bases for self-esteem or self-respect
The
Original Position behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ (cont’d)
bPeople are also allowed basic knowledge, to the
extent needed, of how human beings operate: psychology, economics,
whatever. The final result has to be
viable in practice.
bEnvy is ruled out however: I am interested in
my own welfare and that of people for whom I (will) happen to have a concern,
but I’m not interested in putting other people down.
The
Original Position behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ (cont’d)
bRawls thinks that decisions made behind this
veil of ignorance will be fair: I won’t prejudice against people of a different
race or colour or gender or social class, because I
(and the people I have a concern for) might well be one of them.
bWe can’t advance our own cause, because we
don’t know what our cause will be
The
Original Position behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ (cont’d)
bWhatever their position, each is thus forced to
choose for everyone (cf. Rousseau).
bComments:
•we engage in a kind of role-play: it
is not presumed that we ever are or could be behind such a veil. It’s just a way of defining fairness.
•fair = what is in line with principles
which could be justified by reasonable people with certain informational
constraints.
The Two Principles of Justice:
= what Rawls thinks we will choose
b1. Each person is to have an equal right to the
most extensive total system of basic liberties compatible with a similar system
of liberty for all others (TJ 250 (cf T 60), but see
more careful version in PL 5)
b2. Social and economic inequalities are to be
arranged so that they are both:
•(a) to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged, and
The Two
Principles of Justice:
= what Rawls thinks we will choose (cont’d)
•(b) attached to
offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity.
bSee TJ 60, 83, 250 and PL 5 - 6. In PL Rawls reverses the order of 2(a) and 2
(b).
bThe principles are lexically ordered: I.e. we
satisfy 1 before worrying about 2, we don’t sacrifice
1 for the sake of 2: the liberties of equal citizenship and equality of
opportunity come first.
The Two
Principles of Justice:
= what Rawls thinks we will choose (cont’d)
bThis however presumes a society in which
people’s basic needs are met, to the extent necessary for the basic liberties
to be effectively exercised (cf. TJ 151-152, also cf. esp. PL 7:“In particular,
the first principle…may easily be preceded by a lexically prior principle
requiring that citizens basic needs be met, at least insofar as their being met
is necessary for citizens…to be able fruitfully to exercise those rights &
liberties.
The First Principle (basic liberties)
bThe list includes (what one would expect of a
citizen of the
•political liberty: right to vote and
eligibility for office
•freedom of speech and assembly
•freedom of person and property
•freedom from arbitrary arrest
bCitizens of a just society will have the same
basic rights, along these lines. (Cf. TJ
61)
The Second
Principle (the ‘Difference’ Principle)
bWealth and power are to be distributed equally
unless a difference would make the least advantaged better off.
bStarts out as a more general principle: what justifies differences is that allowing
them may make everyone better off.
bMaking even the least advantaged better off has
the same effect.
The Second Principle (the ‘Difference’
Principle)
bEverybody gets treated as an end, not just as a
means: no one is sacrificed, just to
make some other group or even the majority better off. I.e. this is not the principle of
average utility, which does allow the latter.
bRawls distinguishes, however, between the ‘best
just’, the only just just so to speak, and the
unjust.
The Second
Principle (the ‘Difference’ Principle) (cont’d)
bThe best just arrangement = where the
expectations of the least advantaged are maximized.
bJust = where raising the expectations of
everyone else at least contributes to the welfare of the most disadvantaged
bUnjust = where it makes the most disadvantaged
worse of - also a matter of degree. (Cf.
TJ 78-79)
The Second
Principle (the ‘Difference’ Principle) (cont’d)
bIt is more important to avoid injustice than
aim for the best just.
bRawls seems to think that the situation of
large increases for the better off being justified only by very small changes
for the least advantaged will not occur very often in practice… (see TJ
157-159)
Justifying the Principles
bMainly by way of argument in favour of the superiority of his scheme vis a vis the principle of average
utility.
bHis principles treat everyone as an end, not
just as a means, in a much stronger sense than utilitarianism.
bThey contribute much better to people’s
self-esteem and increase the likelihood
and effectiveness of social co-operation
Justifying
the Principles(cont’d)
bThey require much less benevolence in human
nature
bThere is also a technical argument: the
original position places people in a situation in which it would be reasonable
to ‘maxmin’: to adopt the alternative the worst
outcome of which is superior to the worst outcomes of the others.
Justifying
the Principles (cont’d)
bRawls thinks that in a situation behind a veil
of ignorance we would indeed go for the ‘maximin’
principle: the bottom has to be something we and those for whom we have a
concern could live with, because, for all we know we could end up there
bAlso, the contract has to be something we could
stay with after the event:
Justifying
the Principles (cont’d)
bWe cannot enter into a contract which we know,
in certain circumstances, we would be inclined to
break.
bAlso, the whole deal relies on the free
co-operation of all the citizens: we have to be able to depend on what other
people do, including the least advantaged, even if we don’t happen to be
them… A deal we can all live with, no
matter what, in which no one is sacrificed.
Political Liberalism (1993)
bThis updates Theory of Justice, taking
account of various objections made against it.
bIn addition it adapts the argument to the
situation of reasonable pluralism which characterizes modern ‘western’
democracies, and which seems to be the inevitable outcome of free institutions.
Political
Liberalism (1993) (cont’d)
bHow to justify a conception of justice in a
situation characterized by opposed and irreconcilable but reasonable
comprehensive religious, philosophical and moral doctrines.
bOne elaborates it as a purely political
conception, operating with the idea of society as a fair system of co-operation
between free and equal citizens.
Political
Liberalism (1993) (cont’d)
bOne uses the Original Position with its ‘veil
of ignorance’ etc. as a way of elaborating what this might mean.
bOne then gets it accepted (or puts it forward
as a candidate for acceptance) via an overlapping consensus between the
reasonable comprehensive doctrines at work in a society, each from its own
point of view.
Political
Liberalism (1993) (cont’d)
bThis obviates the need for either a
transcendental basis or for Rawls to argue for a comprehensive view of his own.
bThere is a bit of a problem with defining what’s
reasonable, without circularity. A
comprehensive viewpoint which would use State power to enforce itself against
other viewpoints in a situation of reasonable pluralism ends up being not
reasonable.
Critique and Response to Critique (cont’d)
bRawls’ Theory of Justice took political
philosophy in the English speaking world onto a whole new level of
sophistication.
bSo much so that political philosophy after
Rawls can be regarded, in large part, as a series of reactions to Rawls.
bFor some of the critique and how a Rawlsian might respond, see overheads...