DETERMINANTS OF
RECENT THINKING
ABOUT HUMAN KNOWING
1.
Developments
in the philosophy of the Human and Social Sciences,
i.e. debates in Hermeneutics,
Critical Theory,
Structuralism,
Deconstructionism
Etc.
(See next topic.)
2. Developments
in the History, Sociology and Philosophy of the Natural Sciences (and implicitly
also of all science),
making for a movement towards increasingly
sophisticated and less idealistic understandings of what constitutes method in
science,
and how the history and sociology of science
actually work.
The central figure here = Karl Popper.
(See below for
more on this.)
Such developments have helped to change
our perception of the ‘knowledge game’ generally
(including in Theology)
THE BIG ISSUE
FOUNDATIONALISM
VERSUS
NOT- FOUNDATIONALISM
FOUNDATIONALISM:
Some images:
The Tree of Knowledge
The Temple of Knowledge
FOUNDATIONALISM
· That
there are self-evidently reliable sources of knowledge, e.g. observation and experiment, Scripture,
Scripture and Tradition, Scripture, Tradition and the Magisterium
· That
there are reliable methods of deriving and validating the rest of knowledge by
reference to contributions from these foundational sources, e.g. Induction and Deduction for developing and
testing theories, theologies, creeds and declarations developed by reference to
and validated by scripture and tradition.
Thus
Theories, Dogmas, Theologies, New Knowledge
Reliable methods for developing and validating these by reference
to certain
Foundational Sources of Knowledge
Problems with Foundationalism:
1)
The
status of so-called foundational truths:
· "Theory Laden"
· "Tradition Dependent", i.e.
what the supposed foundation is depends on what tradition you happen to be in.
2)
Problems
with the track from Foundation to New Knowledge
· It's far from purely deductive or purely
inductive
· W.r.t. Theology, problems with 'Development of
Doctrine', which, in fact, can be quite messy.
Such problems
have led to various kinds of 'Non-Foundationalism',
as determined especially by
Various Moves
In 20th Century
Philosophy of Science
But also by the
failure of past foundational projects in philosophy
(Descartes,
Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Husserl.)
Classic Theory of Empirical Science
From Robert Grosseteste (13th
C.), Roger Bacon, Francis Bacon,
Theories
Induction Hypothetico-Deductive Verification
Observation and Experiment
(plus Logic and Maths)
Some 20th Century 'Logical Positivists'
Theories
Doesn't really Hypothetico-
Matter Deductive
Verification
Observation and Experiment
(plus Logic and Maths)
Plus, if it's not verifiable it's not meaningful e.g. religion, God
etc.
There may be no logic of discovery, but there is a strong logic of
justification, and that's what counts.
Karl Popper: the turning point
· Sciences as Conjectures and Refutations
· The following schema:
Theories
Doesn't really Hypothetico
Matter Deductive
Falsification
(only)
'Basic Statements'
(Theory-laden:
Science "Built on a Swamp")
You hang on to what is surviving
falsification.
As soon as it's falsified, you give it
up.
Falsifiability as a criteria of
demarcation of science from non-science.
Karl Popper: Science "Built on a Swamp"
· Post-Popperian
philosophy of science, for the most part: even Popper is a bit naïve, not sophisticated
enough, not congruent with what actually happens
· Important players include: Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend, Thomas Kuhn, and various advocates of science
as the construction and testing of more or less applicable models.
Imre Lakatos:
"Research Programs"
· Scientists don't in fact give up on a
theory no matter how falsified, until they have a better one. It is only when there are one or more viable
competitors in the system that 'anomolies' become
'crucial experiments'
· Better to think in terms of 'Progressive'
and 'Regressive' Scientific 'Research Programs', with people gradually changing
sides, the young people first
· Each research program can be construed as
a series of concentric circles, with a hard core of key commitments all but unfalsifiable, surrounded by a 'protective belt' of not
easily given up theory, surrounded by a 'periphery' of applications to
particular problems easily falsified and given up, but it doesn't touch the
core.
Thus:
Protective
Belt
Core
Periphery
(easily falsified and
given up, but doesn't
affect the core)
· For an
interesting contemporary theological appropriation of Lakatos,
see particularly Nancey Murphy.
Some people think
even this is all too organized, to explain what happens in practice, that even Lakatos' 'sophisticated falsificationism'
is naïve.
Paul Feyerabend: "Theoretical
Anarchism"
· In practice, if you look at the history, "Anything Goes", and should be
allowed to go.
· All facts are theory-laden
· The more theories we have, the more
chance reality has to break through…
People who think
this is all too anarchic will often prefer his more well-known colleague,
Thomas H. Kuhn
Thomas Kuhn: "Paradigms"
· Kuhn distinguishes two kinds of science,
'
· The appearance of anarchy is mostly
confined to Revolutionary Science.
Within '
· What's meant by a 'paradigm' is pretty
vague, perhaps best explained by example.
The problem is that they are so over-arching as to define what is meant
by 'science' and what counts as 'good science'
Thus:
Two Kinds of Science
"Normal" "Revolutionary"
|
Inside a
'paradigm' |
Involving
change of paradigm |
|
Rule governed |
Not rule
governed, maybe even 'conversion' |
|
E.g.
Aristotle-Ptolemy, Galilean-Newtonian, Einstein –
Quantum |
From
Aristotle to Galileo/Newton, From |
|
Rational,
ordered, but only within the paradigm |
Chaotic, no
inter paradigm rationality |
· For a recent example of theological
appropriation of paradigm theory, see especially: Hans Kung and David Tracy: Paradigm Change in Theology (1989)
Science as Construction and Testing of 'Models':
Mary Hesse, Mario Bunge
and (lots of) others
· Scientific procedure = the construction
and testing of models
· Models as more or less applicable rather than true or false
· The most important thing to know about a
model are its limits of applicability
· Models are often disciplined metaphors,
i.e. metaphors have a constructive, creative role in science, not merely
illustrative.
· The major difference between metaphor and
model: a clearer distinction between positive, neutral and negative analogy
Positive: how it does apply
I.e. Model Neutral: not known to what extent it applies
Negative: how
it doesn't apply
It's the 'neutral'
bit which generates interesting hypotheses for testing.
In Theology, lots
of users: Avery Dulles, Ian Barbour, Ian T. Ramsey, Janet Soskice, Ray Collins,
and
Especially
Sallie McFague.
In the case of
Sallie McFague, combined with deconstructionism
(Derrida) and the work of Paul Ricoeur, it has led to
a re-invigoration of metaphorical
theology.
There has been a
more general realization that metaphors function creatively in theology also or
even more so.
(Though one must
still distinguish between 'conceptual' and 'metaphorical' models…)
The Consequence of all this
(among other things, e.g. certain moves in
general philosophy and in philosophical ethics - esp. MacIntyre)
for many people
a move
towards
Non-Foundationalism
: all enquiry is 'tradition constituted',
paradigm determined, happens within a 'research program' etc.,
including moral enquiry
Extreme: Moderate:
Epistemological e.g. 'theory
Anarchism
competition theory
'Deconstructionism'
Non- Foundationalism
(Moderate)
Two Situations:
1)
Competition
within a
Tradition of enquiry (MacIntyre)
Research Program (Lakatos)
Paradigm (Kuhn)
Will be governed by a "Tradition-Constituted Rationality"
2)
Competition
between traditions of enquiry etc.:
Lakatos Kuhn.
MacIntrye: Feyerabend:
: a kind of rationality :non-rational,
still possible Incommeasurable
(still tradition 'conversion'
constituted)
Perhaps some
very general cross-cultural criteria will be allowed, but not enough to determine
the argument
Theological Application:
Francis Fiorenza
(also Orm Rush)
Theory Background
·
(the Theories
· Message)
I.e.
the taken for
Granted in
Contemporary culture
And in the message
Experience
(Contemporary experience
and culture)
The goal is the
establishment or re-establishment of an (often temporary) 'WIDE REFLECTIVE
EQUILIBRIUM' within the relevant scholarly community.
Eberhard
Herrmann: Scientific Theory and Religious
Belief: (1995)
SCIENTIFIC
THEORY V. 'VIEWS OF LIFE'
Focus: knowledge Focus: engagement
Of reality with reality
Value Free Value added
Dealing with life's
Contingencies, and
Human
life at its best.
Validating a
distinction between good and evil
Right and wrong
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCIENTIFIC THEORY ( = abstract patterns, neither true nor false)
MODELS of reality
Testable hypotheses
Real SYSTEMS
In so far as theories "are
involved in our discussions of reality" and may be used to give rise to
models yielding testable hypotheses, however,
an attitude of
'NON-REPRESENTATIONAL REALISM' (rather than Instrumentalism) with respect to
theories would seem to be appropriate.
VIEWS OF LIFE
·
Do not generate testable hypotheses (i.e. best not
to regard them as statements)
·
Their ADEQUACY however can still be tested, by
reference to
·
Internal consistency
·
Coherence with what we otherwise have
reason to regard as true
·
Whether we can identify ourselves with
them.
·
Given this, and given their function (engagement
with reality), a non-representational realist attitude would seem to be
appropriate also here.
·
Finally, "our reflection on the contingencies of
life take place within the framework of a certain view of life functioning as a
tradition… traditions can be changed…