THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE: INTRODUCTION:

Posing the problem:

Some philosophers: religious language is therefore strictly speaking meaningless, since not verifiable, among other things..

Nowadays we are beyond this: everyone accepts it as meaningful. The question is, how meaningful, what kinds of things do we use it to do.
 

Religious talk/ religious symbolic behaviour generally would seem to serve a number of distinguishable but related functions, at least the following:

1) expressive or emotive:

:to express and evoke certain feeling responses. E.g. "joy to the world", "Nearer my God to thee...", "Praise God from whom all blessings flow", "O my God I am very sorry..."
 

2) pragmatic:

:to modulate and facilitate certain kinds of behaviour. E.g. "this is my commandment, that you love one another...", "go now you are sent forth...", "do unto others as you would have them do unto you: this is the Law and the Prophets".

Religious language has accordingly been likened to or modeled as a variety of "craft-bound discourse" (esp. the north American Catholic philosopher James Ross), with the craft goal as holiness, life in the spirit, divine sonship or daughterhood, eternal life, entrance into the reign of God, rather than to make shoes or to play football or watch cricket. According to James Ross, it is no more nor less strange than these others and just as meaningful, provided it remains part of an 'anchored', 'embedded' and seriously practiced craft. All the above have a technical language of their own, and full comprehension is available only to insiders.
 

3) performative:

: language being used to do things, to make commitments, to bring about states of affairs. E.g. marriage, exchanging marriage vows in a religious setting; e.g. baptism.
 

But also, and very definitely and now pretty widely acknowledged:
 

4) cognitive:

: to express commitment to certain 'facts'?

: to express, and such that involvement in presumes, commitment to a certain vision of life. And it is this which makes the feeling response and behaviour and the commitments we make somehow appropriate: not just for fun but because it fits in with the way things are.

 In the case of religion, this latter is a vision at a very comprehensive level, like a very general theory or super-paradigm or system of metaphysics,

but:

It is this latter relation to certain kinds of experience which helps to explain the seemingly inevitably metaphorical character of religious discourse. The vision in which we stand is revealed in or a response to or strongly motivated by certain originating experiences. In the case of us Christians, these would include the experiences of: Abraham, Sarah, Moses and Miriam, the Old Testament prophets, Jesus, Peter, James and John, Mary Magdalene, Mary the Mother of Jesus, Paul and other members of the early Jesus community.

And it is partly validated by certain kinds of experience and the general experience of life which people standing in the tradition may have ( = 'founded' experience, in so far as standing in the tradition helps us to experience things this way).

 Such a vision is not readily falsifiable. Compare the parable of the Resistance Fighter told by the English philosopher Basil Mitchell . But this is the same with all very general theories, paradigms etc., even in the 'hard' sciences. And as with such very general theories, paradigms, research programs, traditions of enquiry, getting into them while reasonable is not such that you could set up rules about: even philosophers of science are not afraid nowadays to talk about an element of 'conversion'.
 
 

HOWEVER...


In order to make further progress, we will tap into the problem of religious language in three different contexts:

1) early church and medieval: culminating in medieval doctrines of analogy;

2) 20th Century Analytical Philosophy, where religious language has been a major issue since the time of the 'Logical Positivists' in the 1930's.

3) Continental Philosophy: Hermeneutics, Structuralism and Deconstruction, as applied also to religious discourse.
 

For citation above, cf.. Basil Mitchell, editor, The Philosophy of Religion (O.U.P., 1971), pp. 18-19.

Proceed, as you want, to  The Three Ways, and Analogy
or return to  Unit Outline