Only later, as the advance of scientific knowledge progressively chipped away at the body of factual knowledge which was thought to support religion, did "religion" and "belief" diverge.
So today, in many religions, religious belief is regarded as entirely different from (say) scientific belief. The former is often a belief or belief system based on "faith" rather than scientific evidence.
Freedom of belief and communication are the modern equivalents of freedom of religion and speech, and are two of the most fundamental and important freedoms. These freedoms offer hope to the weak and the oppressed: hope that the justice of a situation will eventually be made clear to the majority through argument and communication; hope that new ideas will take root and grow; hope of a better world. But these freedoms are more than a mere comfort for the oppressed. As J Bronowski and B Mazlish wrote (The Western Intellectual Tradition. Harper & Row, New York, 1975. Page 501):
Yet our study shows that freedom is a supple and elusive idea, whose advocates can at times delude themselves that obedience to tyranny is a form of freedom. Such a delusion ensnared men as diverse as Luther and Rousseau, and Hegel and Marx. Philosophically, there is indeed no unlimited freedom. But we have seen that there is one freedom which can be defined without contradiction, and which can therefore be an end in itself. This is freedom of thought and speech - the right to dissent.
...
The evidence of history is strong, that those societies are most creative and progressive which safeguard the expression of new ideas. Societies appear to remain vigorous only so long as they are organised to receive novel and unexpected - and sometimes unpleasant - thoughts.
...
The great creative ages have tended to be those in which reasoned dissent was welcome. One lesson that history teaches here is that such dissent is creative in all fields at once. The art of the Renaissance went hand in hand, in time and in place, with its science.
In Australia, freedom of religion or belief receives little protection. Religions specific to ethnic groups effectively enjoy an advantage in this regard, in that their freedom of religion is protected under the indirect discrimination prohibition of the Race Discrimination Act 1975. Thus, a Sikh who wished to wear a turban would probably be protected against employment discrimination, whereas a catholic who wished to wear religious dress would not.
Paragraph 3 of Article 1, however, makes it clear that it is not envisaged that freedom of religion shall be unfettered when it comes to putting religious belief into practice:
We believe this is an important, and proper, limitation on religious freedom. Apart from the belief and communication aspects, we do not regard freedom of religion as a fundamental freedom in the sense that its preservation is vital to the development and advancement of humanity, as described in the section "Background", above. Rather, freedom to practise religion is a freedom which should be protected on pragmatic grounds in circumstances where some specific social benefit is likely to result.
The reason for protecting religious practices which a significant proportion (perhaps even the majority) of people in a society would find antisocial, or even repugnant, is in order to prevent civil strife, in circumstances where there are (say) two major religious groups in a situation of rivalry. This is not the case in Australia. In fact, religious groupings whose practices are likely to be regarded as anti-social or repugnant by a significant proportion of Australian society would be a tiny minority. In this situation, protecting their practices is likely to promote civil strife rather than prevent it.
Examples of practices which are belief-based (or religion-based) and which in our view do not merit protection are various forms of infant genital mutilation, when performed for religious or cultural reasons (ie, when performed for a reason other than the reasonable probability of benefit to the individual).
If acts which are otherwise prohibited could be done in the name of religion, then it would be difficult to prohibit anything at all. For "religion" does not have a clear definition, and has been interpreted increasingly broadly by the courts. In the widest view, it is any belief system, or even belief. Justice Murphy expressed the opinion in Church of the New Faith v Commissioner for Pay-Roll Tax (Vic), heard in the High Court of Australia (154 CLR 120), that any organisation which claimed to be a religious organisation and which offered a way to find meaning and purpose in life was a religious organisation. Other judges of the High Court have adopted narrower views. In the same case, Chief Justice Mason and Justice Brennan held:
It is difficult to justify protection of acts done on the basis of belief in the supernatural if the protection is not also to extend to acts done on the basis of beliefs which appear to be rationally based.
Thus, we see no need in Australia today for specific protection of belief-based practice, beyond a slightly limited protection of the right to hold and communicate beliefs. Of course, this does not mean that any belief-based practices would necessarily be prohibited, even if they were mildly anti-social. For example, a degree of obstruction in public places by groups such as Hare Krishna or by public meetings such as those convened by Dr Billy Graham in connection with his "Crusades" would be tolerated as a normal use of public space, but would not be regarded as specifically protected by a right of religious practice.
Discrimination on the grounds of religious practice should not be prohibited, except as a component of a general prohibition of discrimination, with appropriate exceptions. (See the Society's paper of April 1996, Discrimination Law - Time to Review the Rationale).
2 Freedom to discuss one's beliefs with others of like mind.
3 Freedom to inform other people of one's beliefs, without encouraging any particular action or belief.
4 Freedom to try to promote one's beliefs among other people, without encouraging any particular action.
5 Freedom to encourage others to take action in accordance with one's beliefs.
6 Freedom to take action in accordance with one's beliefs.
As explained under "Beyond belief and communication", we think component no. 6 should not be protected except as part of a general prohibition of discrimination, with appropriately broad exemptions. Regarding the other components, in the Society's view, freedom of religion and belief should be protected in Australia in accordance with the following scheme:
1 A private freedom to believe what one wants to believe, without taking any action in accordance with the belief.
Limitations:
The component of protection which involves prohibition of discrimination should be limited as described under "Prohibition of discrimination", above.
Protection also should not prohibit discrimination in connection with tuition, or testing of knowledge or competence, or where it can be shown that a particular belief or belief system is likely to be inconsistent with proper performance of a job or function. We believe the limitation is necessary to prevent (say) a person who believes in his ability to fly by flapping his arms from successfully challenging the government's refusal to employ him as a pilot, or an avowed pacifist from successfully challenging the government's refusal to appoint him as head of the Department of Defence. Some members of the Society have argued that this exception may possibly be inconsistent with a broad interpretation of s 116 of the Constitution, but the majority view is that the High Court would be most unlikely to adopt such an interpretation.
2 Freedom to discuss one's beliefs with others of like mind.
Limitations: none.
3 Freedom to inform other people of one's beliefs, without encouraging any particular action or belief.
Limitations:
Protection should not operate to permit nuisance in a public place, or to guarantee any added right to enter private property. Protection should not apply when the person being informed is a child, unless parental consent has been given.
4 Freedom to try to promote one's beliefs among other people, without encouraging any particular action.
Limitations:
As for 3. Also, protection should not operate to negate the law of defamation.
5 Freedom to encourage others to take action in accordance with one's beliefs.
As for 3. Also, protection should not apply to incitement to commit a criminal act.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
June 1997. The Public Policy Assessment Society Inc.
Box 395 WODEN ACT 2606 Australia.